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In previous work we analyzed the incentive effects of the provisions
of private pension plans.
1 The incentive effects were described by the
accrual of pension wealth resulting from an additional year of work,
treating the addition to pension wealth as a form of compensation in
units comparable to the wage. We found that the provisions of almost
all plans implied a large loss in pension wealth for work past the age
of 65. Often this loss was more than 40 percent of the wage that would
be earned for the additional work. In some plans wage earnings after
65 would be entirely offset by the concomitant loss in pension wealth.
The typical plan also provided a substantial incentive to retire at the
age of early retirement provided in the plan. This was often as young
as 55. In addition, the typical plan provides a strong incentive not to
retire before the early retirement age. Although this work documented
the incentive effects inherent in the timing of the accrual of pension
benefits, no attempt was made to estimate the actual effects of these
incentives on retirement. That is, we considered the effect of pension
benefit accrual on compensation by age, but not the effect of compen-
sation on continued labor force participation. Indeed, based on the
data used for that analysis there was no way to relate the plan provisions
to retirement or to departure rates from the firm.
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In this paper, the relationship between pension accrual and retire-
ment is analyzed based on the experience in a large Fortune 500 firm
engaged in sales. Its name may not be disclosed. The data are the
employment and earnings histories between 1969 and 1984 of all work-
ers who were employed by the firm in any of the years between 1980
and 1984. The provisions of the firm pension plan are such that persons
of the same age face very different pension accrual profiles and thus
pension compensation at a given age. Hence, different individuals face
very different incentives for continued work versus retirement.
The paper begins with a detailed description of the pension plan and
the incentive effects inherent in its provisions. The incentive effects
of the provisions are described in terms of their effects on the budget
constraints facing employees over their working lives. For complete-
ness, the accrual of Social Security benefits is described together with
pension benefit accrual.
The evaluation of the incentive effects of plan provisions requires
the estimation of wage earnings. The procedure used to estimate these
profiles is described in section 10.2.
We then show the relationship between wage earnings, pension wealth
accrual, and Social Security accrual, on the one hand, and departure
rates from the firm, on the other. It is apparent from this relationship
that the effect of the pension plan provisions on departure rates is very
substantial. In subsequent analysis we will develop a model that will
allow us to predict the effect of changes in the provisions on departure
rates. That is not possible based only on the relationships presented
here. But the detail shown here provides information that is often lost
in formal statistical models.
The analysis makes clear that an estimation of the effects of pension
plans on labor force participation of older workers can only be done
by taking account of the precise provisions of individual plans. Simply
knowing that an employee has a private pension plan tells nothing about
the labor force incentive effects of the plan's provisions. While a great
deal of effort has been directed to estimating the effects of Social
Security provisions on labor force participation, much less attention
has been given to the effects of private pension plans. The data pre-
sented here suggest that pension plans are likely to have a much greater
effect than, for example, the recent changes in Social Security benefits.
10.1 The Firm Pension Plan
10.1.1 The Plan's Provisions
The firm has a defined benefit pension plan with earnings-related
benefits and a Social Security offset. The plan's early and normal281 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
retirement ages are 55 and 65, respectively, with vesting after ten
years. Actuarially reduced benefits are available starting at age 55
for vested terminators—vested workers who leave the firm prior to
age 55. Early retirees—workers who retire between ages 55 and 65—
are eligible to receive less than actuarially-reduced benefits. For
workers who retire after age 65 there is no special actuarial benefit
increase.
In addition to the more favorable benefit reduction afforded to early
retirees, they also receive a supplemental benefit equal to their Social
Security offset between the time they retire and the time they reach age
65. Hence, in comparison to a vested terminator who leaves the firm at
age 54 and starts collecting benefits at age 55, an early retiree who leaves
at age 55 enjoys a smaller benefit reduction and also receives a supple-
mental benefit until age 65. Not surprisingly, the profile of vested ac-
crued benefits by age jumps sharply for most workers at age 55. Thus
there is a large bonus for remaining with the firm until age 55.
The formula for the basic benefit before reduction for early retirement
and before any applicable Social Security offset is the average earnings
base times x percent times the first N years of continuous service, plus
y percent times the rest of continuous service:
(1) Benefits = (Earnings Base) [(jc)(Service)],
if Service is less than N years.
Benefits = (Earnings Base) [(jt)(Service) + (y)(Service - AOL
if Service is greater than N years.
The parameters x and y are both less than 0.05, and y is less than x.
N lies between 15 and 30. The average earnings base is calculated based
on earnings between the start year and the year of either vested ter-
mination or retirement. The start year has traditionally been increased
by two years every other year, varying from k to k + 1 years before
the current year, where k is between 5 and 10. In our accrual calcu-
lations, we assume a one- or two-year increase in the start year every
two years. Excluding the two lowest years of earnings (except that the
number of earnings years used cannot be reduced below 5), the earnings
base is calculated as the average annual earnings from the start year
to the year of vested termination or retirement.
The Social Security adjustment (SSADJ) is p (p lies between 0.5
and 1) of the Social Security benefit (SSB) calculated by the firm times
the ratio of completed service to the amount of service the worker
would have if he or she stayed until age 65, less Z (Z lies between
$1,000 and $5,000) times the ratio of continuous service as of 1 January
1976 to the continuous service the worker would have if he or she
stayed until age 65:282 Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise
(2) SSADJ = pSSB—--?—— - Z-
 S(76)
S + (65-A) S + (65-A) "
Here, S is years of service, 5(76) is the years of service the worker
had in 1976, and A is the worker's current age. The first term is smaller
the younger the age of retirement, which reduces the adjustment. But
if the worker has pre-1976 service, the second term is also smaller the
younger the retirement age, and this increases the adjustment.
SSB, the firm's calculation of the worker's age 65 Social Security
benefit, is based on the worker's earnings to date with the firm. In the
SSB formula, earnings last year are extrapolated forward, assuming no
growth factor, until the worker reaches age 65. The average of past
earnings with the firm as well as extrapolated future earnings is then
entered into a three-bracket progressive benefit formula to determine
SSB.
For early retirees the factor by which benefits are reduced depends
on age and service. For example, if the worker retires at age 55 with
20 years of service the reduction is 50 percent; it would be only 33
percent if the worker had 26 or more years of service. For workers
with 30 or more years of service, the reduction drops to zero at re-
tirement ages between 60 and 64.
The pension accrual can vary widely for workers of the same age
but with different service and for workers with the same service but
of different ages. These accrual differences reflect the fact that many
of the features of the benefit and Social Security formulas involve either
age or service or both. Indeed, it is fair to say that the firm's benefit
formula could hardly be better designed from the perspective of max-
imizing service and age-related differences in accruals. This variation
comes at the cost of a fairly complicated set of provisions that may
not be fully understood by individual workers.
10.1.2 Pension Accrual
To describe the effect of the provisions on pension wealth, the accrual
profiles for persons born in different years and hired by the firm in
several different years have been calculated for the calendar period
beginning in 1980. For each employee group defined by year of birth
and year of hire, accruals are calculated through age 70; the number
of years of accruals presented thus depends on the age of the employee
in 1980. One profile is graphed in figure 10. la to illustrate the derivation
of such profiles. Profiles for different employee and age groups are
compared in subsection 10.1.4.
Figure 10.1a shows the pension accrual profile for male managers
born in 1930 and hired by the firm in 1960. By 1980, they were 50 and












Fig. 10.1a Pension wealth accrual, SS accrual, and wage earnings for
male managers born in 1930 and hired in 1960, in real 1985
dollars
we have used the convention that a person hired in a given year has
one year of experience in that year. Thus in some of the tables shown
below, the person used in this example would be assumed to have 21
years of experience in 1980.) The accrual is the change in the discounted
value of future pension benefit entitlements for an additional year of
employment. The accrual of Social Security benefits is shown on the
same graph. Predicted wage earnings for each year are also shown.
These predictions are based on actual average earnings of firm em-
ployees, by age and years of service. The prediction method is de-
scribed and the results are discussed in detail in section 10.2. All of
the numbers presented in this section are in real 1985 dollars.
At age 50, in 1980, the typical male manager has wage earnings of
about $48,446 per year. Compensation in the form of pension accrual
is $2,646, or about 5.5 percent of wage earnings. If the manager were
to retire at this age, he would be entitled to benefits at age 65, based
on his earnings in the 7 or 8 preceding years. The benefits would not
be available until age 65 and thus would have a relatively low present
value at age 50.
As described above, normal retirement benefits could be taken ear-
lier, as early as age 55, but they would be reduced actuarially so that
the present discounted value of the benefits remains unchanged. The
reduction in the benefit would be just enough to offset the fact that
benefits would be received for more years. If the person remains in284 Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise
the firm until age 55 and then retires, however, benefits are available
immediately and the reduction in benefits for early retirement is less
than the actuarial reduction. In addition, the worker who remains until
age 55 and then retires is eligible to receive a supplemental benefit until
age 65 equal to his Social Security offset. Thus there is a very large
increase in pension wealth at age 55, $72,527, corresponding to the
large spike in figure 10.1a. In effect, there is a bonus of $72,527 for
remaining in the firm from age 54 to 55.
After age 55, pension accrual falls, to about 10 percent of the wage
at age 60 (in 1990). Accrual is higher than just before age 55 primarily
because the early retirement reduction factor if the worker remains
until 55 is less than it would be if he left the firm before 55. (If he leaves
before 55, the reduction is actuarially fair.) But as the worker ages
beyond 56, this effect is partially offset by the fact that an additional
year of service adds a smaller percent to benefits. Pension accrual is
in fact negative beginning at age 61 (in 1991). Indeed, between ages 61
and 65 the loss in pension benefits is equivalent to about 20 percent of
wage compensation.
The loss in compensation between ages 60 and 61 is equivalent to a
wage cut of about 14 percent. The worker has 30 years of service at
that age and, because of the plan's early retirement reduction factors,
is already eligible for full retirement benefits. Thus no increase in ben-
efits will result for working another year from the application of one
fewer year of early retirement reduction, as was the case before 30
years of service. In addition, for each year that benefits are not taken
between ages 55 and 65, the receipt of benefits for a year without the
Social Security adjustment (reduction) is foregone. This advantage is
lost at age 65 (in 1995). Thereafter, the loss in benefits from working
an additional year is smaller because this foregone opportunity is no
longer available. In addition, the accruals depend on the Social Security
adjustment and to a small extent on the updating of the years used in
the calculation of the earnings base.
Social Security accruals for the male managers considered in figure
10.1a range from about $1,000 to $8,000 between ages 50 and 65. After
65, Social Security accrual becomes negative, about - $8,500 at age 66.
In summary, the typical manager in the firm, marking about $48,000
per year in wage earnings at age 60, would lose about $42,000 in pension
wealth were he to continue working until age 65. Thus, in addition to
the expected concentration of retirement at age 55, we would expect
a large proportion of this group to retire before 65. After age 65, Social
Security benefit accrual also becomes negative. At 66, the loss in pri-
vate pension benefits and Social Security benefits together amounts to
about 32 percent of wage earnings at that age. This suggests a con-
centration of retirement at 65 as well.285 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
The data in figure 10.1a are shown in the standard budget constraint
form in figure 10.1b. Total compensation, including wage earnings,
Social Security wealth, and pension wealth, is graphed against age,
beginning in 1980. The vertical axis shows the total resources that the
person would acquire from employment with this firm. Accumulated
earnings before 1980 are ignored in the graph.
There is a discontinuous jump in the graph at age 55. For reasonable
preferences for income (that can be used for consumption) versus re-
tirement leisure, one would expect to see a large proportion of workers
facing this constraint retiring at age 55 and most retiring prior to age 65.
Additional graphs showing wage earnings, pension accrual, and So-
cial Security accrual over the working span are shown in figures 10.2a
and 10.2b; again, the first shows accruals by year, and the second shows
cumulated amounts in the standard budget constraint form. These graphs
pertain to a male manager who is hired in 1980 at age 20, and who
continues working with the firm until age 70. For such workers, the
pension accrual at age 55 is $168,000, equivalent to 164 percent of the
wage at that age. Wage earnings for this group reach a maximum at
age 59. Pension benefit accrual becomes negative at age 61, and Social
Security benefit accrual becomes negative at age 65. In the first year
of work after age 65, the loss in pension benefits and Social Security
benefits together amounts to $40,000, about 45 percent of wage earnings
at that age. Thus the lifetime budget constraint shows an upward dis-












Fig. 10.1b Cumulated total income from employment versus year of


















Pension wealth accrual, SS accrual, and wage earnings for











Cum. Earnings* PW + SSW
Cum. Earnings* PW \/
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Fig. 10.2b Cumulated total income from employment versus year of
retirement, male managers born in 1960 and hired in 1980287 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
age 60. The decline is especially abrupt after age 65.
2 Retirement at
age 55, between 55 and 65, and possibly at 65 would seem to be quite
likely for workers facing budget constraints like this one.
10.1.3 Decomposition of Pension Accrual
The calculations underlying the pension accrual in figures 10.1a and
10.1b are explained in this section. The wage earnings and other dollar
values in this section are in current dollars, however, while the graphs
are in constant 1985 dollars. The nominal interest rate assumed through-
out this analysis is 0.09, and the real interest is assumed to equal 0.03.
The calculations are shown in table 10.1 for male managers who were
born in 1930 and hired by the firm in 1960, the same group whose
accrual profile is illustrated in figures 10.1a and 10.1b. Columns (1)
through (4) are self-explanatory. Column (5) is the average earnings
base used to calculate pension benefits. The normal retirement benefit
is shown in column (6). It is calculated using the formula in equation
(1) above. The Social Security benefit in column (7) is calculated by
the firm based on earnings projected forward to age 65. Column (8) is
the Social Security adjustment shown in equation (2). Column (9) is
column (7) minus column (8). Column (10) is 1 minus the early retire-
ment adjustment, the proportion of the benefit that remains after the
adjustment. Once the person has worked for 30 years there is, according
to the firm's early retirement reduction provisions, no reduction even
though the person is only 60 years old at that time.
Column (11) is column (10) times column (6). It is the benefit that a
person who retired early would receive between the early retirement
age and age 65. After age 65, benefits are based on the adjusted re-
tirement benefits, reduced by the early retirement reduction factor.
These benefits are shown in column (12), which is column (10) times
column (9).
The annuity value of a dollar received each year from 65 until death
is shown in column (13). It accounts for the probability that a person will
be alive at each year in the future. The probability that a person will live
from the current age until 65 is shown in column (14). The current value
of a dollar that will be received at age 65 is shown in column (15). At the
current age, the present value of the pension benefits that the manager
can receive at age 65 is shown in column (16), and is given by column
(12) x column (13) x column (14) x column (15).
If the manager retires at age 55 or later, he will receive benefits until
age 65 that are not reduced by the Social Security adjustment. He
receives the normal retirement benefits in column (6) reduced only by
the early retirement reduction factor, column (10), and shown in column
(11). The present value of these benefits from the year of first collection
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will be received after age 65 and the present value of his pension wealth
and are shown in column (18) (column [16] plus column [17]).
The change in pension wealth from one year to the next, I(a), the
pension accrual, is shown in column (19). The accrual at age a is given
by
(3) I(a) = Pw(a + 1) - Pw(a)(l + r)
where Pw is pension wealth and r is the nominal interest rate (0.09).
Again, these pension accruals, together with Social Security accruals
and the wage, are graphed in figure 10.1a, but in 1985 dollars. The
accrual as a percentage of wage earnings is shown in column (20).
3
10.1.4 Variation in Accrual Profiles by Age and Year of Hire
The two accrual profiles discussed above pertain to persons who
were born in a given year and who were hired by the firm in a given
year. The profile in the calendar period beginning in 1980 may be quite
different for persons of different ages and with different years of ser-
vice. Thus, profiles have been calculated for several additional groups,
fifteen in all, defined by year of birth and year of hire, as shown in
table 10.2. Pension accruals for managers with these birth and hire
years are shown in table 10.3. Those born in 1940 reach age 55 in 1995,
and for each of these groups there is a discontinuous increase in pension
wealth in that year. It is $29,639 for those with 15 years of service in
that year and $82,953 for those with 25 years of service. Comparable
jumps occur in 1985 for those born in 1930. Accruals are often negative
for persons over 60.
Pension accruals provide a large incentive for some groups to stay
in the firm for another year and a strong incentive for others to leave.
For example, staying with the firm in 1985 brings pension accrual of
$72,527 for 55-year-old managers with 25 years of service (born in 1930
and hired in 1960), but a loss of $14,936 for 65 year olds with 35 years
of experience (born in 1920 and hired in 1950). Thus there is enormous
variation in the effective compensation for continued service. One might
expect, therefore, that some groups would be much more likely than
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In some instances there are erratic fluctuations from one year to the
next, from negative to positive to negative, for example. This typically
occurs if an increase in benefits in one year is not followed by a com-
parable increase in the next. For example, suppose that the normal
retirement benefit is higher in year a than in either year a - 1 or in
year a + 1. Then the accrual from a - 1 to a will tend to be positive,
but the accrual from a to a + 1 will tend to be negative. Dropping a
low earnings year and adding a higher one in the calculation of the
earnings base may create this effect. Other provisions in the pension
calculation formula may do so as well. For convenience, total cumu-
lated pension wealth is shown in table 10.4 for the same groups. Social
Security accruals and cumulated Social Security wealth are shown in
tables 10.5 and 10.6, respectively. Annual wage earnings and cumulated
earnings are shown in tables 10.7 and 10.8.
Two of the profiles were shown in figures 10.1 and 10.2 above; several
others are shown below. Young new hires will have rapid wage growth
in the subsequent 20 years, but very little accrual of pension wealth.
This is shown in figure 10.2 for persons born in 1960, 20 years old at
the time of hire in 1980. Their incomes will rise from about $20,000 in
1980 to over $70,000 in the year 2000, when they are 40 years old. But
even in 2000 their pension accrual will be only $1,558. Their total
accrued pension wealth at age 40 will be only $11,894, a very small
fraction (1.2 percent) of their total earnings over the period.
A manager hired in 1980, but born in 1940, will have much lower
wage growth over the next 20 years, from about $28,000 in 1980 to
under $52,000 at age 60 in 2000 (see figs. 10.3a and 10.3b). This person
will also have little pension wealth accrual through age 54, when his
total pension wealth will be less than $13,000. In 1995, however, when
the person is 55 and eligible for early retirement, it will increase by
almost $30,000 to a total of over $47,000. In the next few years accrual
is less than $7,000 per year. The age 55 spike in accrual suggests a
potential concentration of retirement among this group at age 55 (in
1995). But the actual pension that would be received is still very small,
only about 12 percent of salary (from tables not shown). Thus retire-
ment may be unlikely.
Managers of the same age, but hired 10 years earlier may be much
more likely to retire in that year (see figs. 10.4a and 10.4b). They
experience a much sharper increase in pension wealth in 1985, from
just under $42,000 to over $133,000. The pension benefit to wage re-
placement rate at 55 for this group is about 26 percent. But accrual
after 55 remains positive for this group; pension wealth increases to
almost $209,000 by age 60. Thus pension wealth accrual may still pro-
vide a substantial incentive to remain with the firm.
In contrast, persons born in 1920 and hired by the firm at age 40 (in
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Fig. 10.4b Cumulated total income from employment versus year of
retirement, male managers born in 1940 and hired in 1970305 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
will become negative in a few years (see figs. 10.5a and 10.5b). Earnings
for this group are declining as well. One might think that persons who
are in this group and are still working would be likely to retire. But,
if still working, they chose not to retire earlier, when compensation
from continued work began to decline. They would have been eligible
for early retirement at age 55 (in 1975), when they had been employed
for 15 years.
At that time they would have faced earnings and pension accrual
profiles like those shown in figures 10.6a and 10.6b. The group de-
scribed in these graphs was born and hired 10 years later (in 1930 and
1970, respectively) and thus had 15 years of service at age 55 (in 1985),
when pension accrual was at a maximum. Thereafter, accrual declines
and becomes negative around age 65, after 25 years of service. That
the group pictured in figure 10.5 did not retire earlier may suggest that
their preferences are such that they are also not likely to retire in a
given subsequent year either. They may want to work more than others
and that may be why they did not retire when pension accrual and
earnings started to decline. In addition, however, the group had not
accumulated substantial pension wealth at any time, even before it
began to decline, and thus they may always have been in a poor position
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Fig. 10.5a Pension wealth accrual, SS accrual, and wage earnings for
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Fig. 10.6b Cumulated total income from employment versus year of
retirement, male managers born in 1930 and hired in 1970
10.1.5 Variation by Employee Type
The pension accrual profiles for other employee groups look very
much like those described above. Accrual is minimal during the first
years of service. There is typically a discontinuous increase in pension
wealth at age 55. And accrual typically becomes negative after 30 years
of service, sometimes before that. Social Security accrual becomes
negative after 65. The major differences among the groups stem from
different age-earnings profiles. An illustration of the similarity and dif-
ference is provided by graphs like that in figure 10.2, but for different
employee groups. These are shown in figures 10.7 through 10.11 for
male managers, salesmen, saleswomen, male office workers, and fe-
male office workers, respectively. (The graphs for male managers are
reproduced here for ease of comparison.) In each case the data pertain
to persons born in 1960 and hired in 1980. Thus they all pertain to
compensation over the life cycle for persons who remain in the firm.
As is clear from the graphs, the accrual profiles are qualitatively similar;
but there are some important differences.
First, managers earn more than the other employee groups. The wage
earnings profiles also differ in shape. The peak earnings for managers
occur at age 59. At age 66, if they still are in the labor force, 45 percent
of their wage earnings are offset by negative pension and Social Se-
curity accrual. The earnings of salesmen peak much earlier, at age 50.
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Fig. 10.11b Cumulated total income from employment versus retirement,
female office workers born in 1960 and hired in 1980313 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
in pension and Social Security wealth. Thus this effect creates a greater
incentive for the salesmen than for the managers to retire after age 65.
4
The peak wage earnings for saleswomen occur at age 57; at 66 almost
75 percent of their wage earnings are offset by pension and Social
Security wealth losses. The peak earnings for male and female office
workers occur at ages 59 and 62, respectively. At age 66, 48 and 46
percent, respectively, of their earnings would be offset by loss in pen-
sion and Social Security wealth.
5
The budget constraints for all groups show a discontinuous jump at
age 55, but it seems most pronounced for managers. The budget con-
straint for salesmen is essentially flat after 65; their net compensation
after 65 is virtually zero. The same is true for saleswomen. The net
compensation of managers and male office workers is positive, but
declining rapidly at age 65, and the budget constraints for these two
groups become flatter after 65. The budget constraint nonlinearities
seem to be the least pronounced for female office workers.
10.2 The Prediction of Earnings of the Firm's Workers
Data are available for each worker employed in the firm from the
beginning of 1980 through the end of 1984. Most were in the firm in
more than one year and many for all years. These years define the
sample. Earnings for anyone in the sample are available beginning in
1969 if the person was employed then or beginning in the year that the
person joined the firm if it was after 1969. Thus it is possible to follow
the same person for up to 17 years. In particular, it is possible to
estimate individual-specific earnings effects. By combining data for
workers of different ages and with different years of service in the firm,
it is possible to predict earnings. We use these predicted earnings in
considering whether a person leaves the firm in a given sample year,
like 1980. The probability of departure in a given year is related to how
much the person would have earned during that year and on pension
and Social Security accrual during that year. In future estimations, we
will consider not only next year's earnings and pension and Social
Security accrual, but also the effects of future earnings and pension
and Social Security accrual.
Because earnings in the first and last years in the firm are likely to
represent pay for only part of the year, they are excluded in the esti-
mation of earnings. To be included, a person must have earnings data
for at least three years. Workers with three years of data would have
only one usable earnings observation. This group must be distinguished
in the estimation procedure. Although persons with fewer than three
years of earnings are not used in the estimation of earnings equations,
they are included in the analysis of retirement discussed in section 10.3.314 Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise
In this section the earnings estimation procedure is discussed first, then
the results are presented. In addition to their use in the subsequent
prediction of retirement, the earnings results are of considerable in-
terest in their own right. It is rare to have access to earnings data for
the same persons over such a long period. It is often claimed, for
example, that real wage earnings decline late in a person's working
life. We are able to determine with relative certainty whether this is
true for this firm.
10.2.1 The Method
Earnings histories from 1969 are available for workers employed
during the period 1980 through 1984. To explain the main features of
the estimation procedure, figure 10.12 describes the earnings of two
persons who are in the data set for seven years. The first person is age
40 to 46 over these seven years, and the second is age 45 to 51. (They
could also have different years of service, but that is ignored in this
example.) Earnings by age for the typical person in the firm are rep-
resented by the solid line in the middle of the graph. The first person
has higher earnings than the average employee. His earnings exceed
those of the typical person by an amount ux, the individual-specific
earnings effect for person 1. It may arise, for example, because this
person works harder than the typical employee or because he has
greater ability or more training. Earnings for person 1 fluctuate from
year to year, however. The deviations with age from the central ten-
dency of his earnings, indicated by the person 1 average, are indicated
by nu, where t indicates the deviation in year t. Future earnings for
person 1 must be estimated for our analysis. They are indicated by the
dashed part of the line. They depend on ux and on the estimated re-
40 42 44 46 48 50
Fig. 10.12 Illustration of individual-specific earnings effects315 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
lationship between age and earnings, which, aside from the individual-
specific term, is assumed to be the same for individuals within a sex-
occupation group. The earnings model is presented more formally in
the following subsections.
Earnings Equation Specification
To simplify the presentation, we include only one right-hand variable,
age. In practice, estimation is based on age and years of service. The
exact specification is presented below. An earnings equation that cap-
tures the ideas discussed above is:
(4) In Eit = A, + j8,Al7 + /32A? + eit
= At// + Bit.
Bit = Ui + 7}it.
Var(e) = Var(w) + Var(<r?) = a*, Var (u) = CT
2U, Var (TJ) = a%.
Cov(uh7ii,) = Cov(T}i,,r)it) = 0.
E = Annual earnings,
A = Age,
/ = Indexes individuals,
t = Indexes year (e.g., 1978, . . . , 1983),
ut = Individual-specific earnings effect.
The last approximation is a reminder that because of the nonlinear
relationship between earnings and age, the expected value of exp^,-,)
is not equal to 1, even though the expected value of T)it is 0.
In addition to the parameters (3, the variances of u and r\ are also of
interest. The first indicates the systematic earnings variation across
individuals due to individual-specific effects. The second is a measure
of the extent of nonsystematic variation. The method of estimation
used here does not allow for the possibility that the individual-specific
terms u may be correlated with age. For example, it may be that persons
whose earnings are higher, because of the attributes u, are more likely
to continue working at older ages. We did obtain such estimates using
a differencing procedure. But for our purposes the procedure has two
important shortcomings: First, it means that certain age and service316 Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise
parameters are not identified. Second, it imposes the rate of salary
increase by age that existed over the period of the data, because this
relationship depends only on changes in earnings over the period of
the data. (The method we use allows the effect of age to be determined
in part by comparison of the earnings of workers with very different
ages.) This increase is apparently low relative to longer term increases
and, hence, may imply expected future increases with age and service
that are too low. We also discovered that individual-specific terms based
on the method that we have used are not correlated with firm departure
rates.
Estimation Method
Estimation of equation (4) yields residuals
(5) eit = In Eit - ft, -j8,Aft - jM?,.






where nt is the number of observations for person /, and k is the number
of parameters (three in this example). To obtain estimates of additional
parameters of interest we need to distinguish persons with more than
one observation from those with only one.
Using Persons with nt> 1. From the residuals for person /, the
individual-specific effect for / is calculated by
(7)
The variances of 17 and u are then given, respectively, by
2 (e» ~ u,)
2
(8) 0-2 = ^ : ;, and
2, n( - k - I
i
(9) Var(«) = Var(e) - Var(«),
where / is the number of persons in the sample (in this instance those
with nt > 2), and
(10) i)it = eit - Ui.
For Persons with n-t = 1. If a person has only one observation, we
cannot distinguish 17,, from uh since we do not observe any variation317 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
around an average. First note that if u and r\ are normally distributed,
and thus s is also, then
E(u\E) = E(u) + pu E — [e - E(e)]
' (T
e
= 0 + pU)E ^ (e - 0)
= Pu.
= T
2 COV(M,S) = E[lt(u + 7))] = &l
COV(M,S) <T\
HUtE VVar(«) • VVar (e) o-M Vo"
2 + <T\ o-e'
where p is a correlation coefficient. Thus,




2 were 0 and we observed eit, we would assume it represented
entirely an individual-specific effect ut. If cr
2 were 0, we would assume
the eit were equal to the random term TJ,,, and that there was no indi-
vidual effect Uj. Letting eit be the sample analog of eit and using the
estimates in equations (2) and (4) for cr
2, and cr
2, respectively, ut for
persons with only one observation is estimated by
6-? - o-
2
(11) At = ,2
 v eit,
and T)it by
Predicted Earnings. For an estimation of the likelihood that a person
will retire in the next year, we need to use predicted earnings in that
year. For future analysis we will need to predict earnings in subsequent
years as well. The predictions are given by:
Eit = e^' e
a> E(e^>) = ^«
+"< (1 + 6-2/2), for nt > 2.
Eit = eh. e*> E(e^>) = ^"
+"' (1 + 6-2/2), for nt > 1.
For out-of-sample estimates,/!,, would be predicted from future age,
for example.
6318 Laurence J. KotlikofT David A. Wise
The Estimated Components of Earnings. To consider how much earn-
ings deviate from what might be predicted for that person, or from
what that person himself might predict, it is useful to divide earnings
into expected and unexpected components. We do that by denning
(13) ln£,, = jiit + fy + i]it .
jxit + Ui = "permanent" or "expected" component.
r)it = "transitory" or "unexpected" component.
These definitions do not necessarily correspond to usual definitions of
permanent versus transitory income, so the expected versus unex-
pected terminology may be better. In levels, the two components are
given by
(14) Eit = e^' + Ui • e*><
— g/J-it + tij _|_ gfi-u + Ui ^eVit — 1)
_ permanent transitory
component component'
A More Detailed Specification of the Earnings Function
Earnings were predicted using the following variables:
Age
Age Squared
Age Squared times Service
Service
Service Squared
Service Squared times Age
Age times Service
Age Squared times Service Squared
Calendar Year Variables for 1969, . . . , 1979 and 1981, . . . , 1983.
The calendar year variables pick up changes in real earnings over time.
Each of the year estimates is relative to the 1980 base.
Earnings Function Estimates
The estimated earnings function parameters are shown in table 10.9.
The implications of the estimates are shown in figures 10.13a through
10.13e, distinguished by employee group. Figure 10.13a, for example,
shows earnings profiles for managers by age of hire in 1980, where the
nine profiles on the graph pertain to persons hired at successively older
ages—from 20 to 60 in five-year intervals. Earnings are calculated
through age 70 for each cohort. First, it is clear that, for any age,


























































































































































































































































































































^-statistics are in parentheses.
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Fig. 10.13a
65 70
Age-earnings profiles for persons hired in 1980, by age when
hired, male managersC0L1
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Fig. 10.13b
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Age-earnings profiles for persons hired in 1980, by age when
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time of hire increase with age, but the bulk of the difference in earnings
is accounted for by years of service in the firm. For example, persons
who are 55 and just hired earn much less than those who are 55, but
have been working for the firm since age 20. Finally, the decline in
earnings for older workers is much greater for long-term employees
than for those who have been hired recently.
Similar patterns apply to other employee groups, but with some
significant variations. The earnings of male office workers at the time
of hire vary greatly by age, increasing and then declining rapidly (fig.
10.13d). The importance of these profiles for our work is that future
expected earnings depend in an important way on the age and years
of service of an employee, and on the employee group.
In our prediction of earnings beyond 1984, we use the 1984 year
dummy and add a 1.5 percent real wage growth factor; that is, the
predicted earnings for year / is the predicted earnings for 1984 times
(1.5)(f - 1984).
10.3 The Relationship between Retirement, Age, and
Years of Service
In this section, the relationship of retirement to age and years of
service is described. The intention is to consider the extent to which
retirement behavior is consistent, by economic reasoning, with the
budget constraints described in section 10.2. To do this, we consider
in detail empirical hazard rates by age and years of service. These
results will serve as a guide to future development and estimation of
more formal models of retirement. They are the empirical regularities
with which the models must be consistent. This extensive descriptive
analysis supports several initial conclusions:
• The favorable early retirement benefits have a very strong effect
on departures from the firm, increasing departure rates between
ages 55 and 60 by possibly as much as 30 percentage points (e.g.,
from 14 to 44 percent).
• The loss in compensation due to negative pension accrual for many
employees after age 60 and negative Social Security accrual after
age 65 apparently also induces departure; only 58 percent of those
employed at age 54 remain through age 59, and only 21 percent of
those employed at 59 remain through 64. About half of the few
remaining at 65 retire at that age.
• The special early retirement incentive offered in one year increased
departure rates very substantially.
10.3.1 Empirical Hazard Rates
Hazard rates by age and years of service are shown for all employees
combined in table 10.10. The yearly hazard rate is the proportion ofTf •t r<1 in N N
— — fs — rn— N N m o\ J om N n N ooomo
NfNjDtV-O
— ^t o •* >—> —•
O 00 » «325 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
those employed at the beginning of the year that retires—strictly speak-
ing, leaves the firm—during the forthcoming year. Several aspects of
the data stand out. There is substantial turnover in the first 9 years of
employment, especially during the first 5 years. On average, about 15
percent of those employed 5 years or less leave in a given year. The
table shows rates only for employees 40 and older. The departure rates
are somewhat higher for younger workers, 16 or 17 percent for those
employed 5 years or less and 10 to 12 percent for those employed 6 to
9 years. There is a sharp decline in departure rates at 10 years of
service, when employees are about to become vested in the pension
plan. Before the early retirement age, 55, the typical decline is from 8
or 9 to 4 or 5 percent. After 55, when vesting carries with it eligibility
for early retirement, it is much sharper, often from 10 percent or more
to 3 percent or less.
The availability of early retirement benefits at 55 apparently has a
substantial effect on retirement. Before 55 departure rates are typically
around 2 percent. At 55, they jump to 10 percent or more. It is important
to notice that the departure rates stay at that level until age 60, when
there is another jump in the rate of departure. The jump at 60 corre-
sponds to the age at which pension accrual becomes negative for many
employees. (For those with 25 or more years of service, benefits in-
crease at a smaller percent per year. After age 60 with 30 years of
service, there is no early retirement reduction; full retirement benefits
are available.)
To understand the potential importance of the early retirement ben-
efits, suppose that if it were not for this inducement, the departure
rates would remain at 3 percent until age 60 instead of the 10 or 12
percent rates that are observed. (Notice that the departure rates for
employees aged 55 to 61 who are in their tenth year of service—not
yet vested and hence not eligible for early retirement benefits—are also
2 or 3 percent on average.) Departure at 3 percent per year would mean
that 14 percent of those who were employed at 55 would have left
before age 60. At a departure rate of 11 percent per year, 44 percent
would leave between 55 and 59. Such a difference, even if only for a
small proportion of all firms, can have a very substantial effect on
aggregate labor force participation rates. It is in part the dramatic fall
in labor force participation rates for the older population that has mo-
tivated research such as ours.
The jump in departure rates at 60, especially noticeable for persons
with 25 or more years of service, has just been mentioned above. There
is another sharp increase in departure rates at 62 when Social Security
benefits are first available. (There is no sharp kink in the budget con-
straint at this age because of the actuarially fair increase in Social
Security benefits if their receipt is postponed until age 65.) The increase326 Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise
at 62 is also noticeable for employees with less than 10 years of service
and not yet vested in the firm pension plan. They can take Social
Security benefits, of course.
Finally, there is a very sharp increase in the departure rate at age
65. At this age the loss in Social Security benefits with continued work
induces a kink in the budget constraint. As described above, the budget
constraint for many workers becomes essentially flat at this age, due
to negative pension accruals and falling wage earnings, as well as the
loss in Social Security wealth. The fall in wage earnings and pension
wealth typically begins at an earlier age, as emphasized above. It is
important to keep in mind that the large departure rates before 65 mean
that most employees have left well before that age. Thus high departure
rates at 65 indicate only that a large proportion of the few that continue
work until 65 retire then. The cumulative hazard rates below highlight
this point.
A more compact version of table 10.10 is shown in table 10.11 for
salesmen. About 40.7 percent of employees are salesmen and women,
about 56.2 percent are office workers, and only 3.1 percent are man-
agers. Thus, for purposes of comparison, it is best to have in mind the
accrual and budget constraint graphs for sales and office workers. These
results confirm the findings for all employees discussed above. They




































































































18327 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
• There is a large increase in the departure rates at the early retire-
ment age of 55, but only for vested employees, those with at least
10 years of service. For employees with 16 or more years of service,
the jump in departure rates increases very noticeably with age.
• The departure rates remain at these higher rates through age 59.
• At age 60, the departure rates increase very precipitously for per-
sons with 30 or more years of service, for whom full benefits are
available; there is no longer an early retirement reduction and sub-
sequent pension accrual is negative.
• When Social Security benefits become available at 62, the depar-
ture rates increase very sharply, but apparently only for those who
are vested in the firm plan, contrary to the results for all employees
taken together.
• Finally, there is a large increase in departure rates at 65, after
which Social Security accrual rates become strongly negative.
Cumulative hazard rates for all employees are shown in table 10.12
for three years, together with the rates by age. The cumulative rates
are actually one minus the percent who have departed. These departure
rates were obtained by calculating hazard rates over the next four years
separately for persons who were age 50 in 1980, age 51 in 1980, . . . ,
and age 63 in 1980. Those who were age 50 in 1980 were 51 in 1981,
52 in 1983, etc. Thus these calculations yield hazard rates in different
years for employees of the same age. In particular, given employment
at age 50, the cumulative rates show the percent still employed at older
ages. (The cumulative rates for those aged 50 are all based on the 1980
departure rate of 0.031. The rates for those aged 51 are all based on
the 1981 rate of 0.033. The 1983 rate for those aged 52 is based on the
1982 rate. The rate for those who were 65 in 1981 is based on the 1983
rate.)
Note first that departure rates of employees who have been in the
firm for only 8 to 10 years, and are not yet vested, are very low at
every age, as emphasized above. And again, the increase in the de-
parture rates at 55, 60, 62, and 65 stands out. Based on the 1981 and
1982 departure rates, only 48 percent of those employed at 50 would
still be employed at 60, and then 17 percent of these would leave. Only
10 percent would remain until age 65 and then about 50 percent of
these would leave.
The data also show the effect of a special early retirement incentive
that was in effect in 1982 only. The incentive program provided a bonus
to employees who were eligible for early retirement in 1982; that is,
those who were vested and were 55 years old or older. The bonus was
equivalent to three months salary for 55-year-old employees and in-














































































































































12 months salary for employees with 20 or fewer years of service and
declined to 6 months salary for those with 30 to 39 years of service.
It is clear that the effect of the incentive was large. The departure
rates for 1981 and for 1983 are virtually identical. But the rates were
much higher in 1982. For example, the departure rate for 60 year olds
was 17 percent in 1981 and in 1983, but 29 percent in 1982. For those
age 63, the departure rate was 37 percent in 1981 and in 1983, but 54
percent in 1982. Of those employed at age 50, 40 percent would still
have been employed after age 60 based on the 1981 and 1983 departure
rates. Only 27 percent would remain after age 60 based on the 1982
rates.
7
Even under the normal plan, only 10 percent of those employed at
age 50 would still be employed at 65. Only 1 percent would remain
until 65 with the special incentive.
10.4 Summary and Conclusions
The provisions of the pension plan in a large corporation have been
described in detail. The implications of the provisions are described329 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
by pension accrual profiles. The pension accrual profiles are set forth
together with standard age-earnings profiles and Social Security accrual
profiles in the form of lifetime budget constraints. The plan provides
very strong incentives to retire beginning at age 55. After age 65, neg-
ative pension accruals and negative Social Security accruals effectively
impose almost a 100 percent tax rate on wage earnings for many em-
ployees of the firm.
Departure rates from the firm have been compared with economic
incentives inherent in the plan provisions. It is clear from this descrip-
tive analysis that the inducements in the plan provisions to retire early
have had a very substantial effect on departure rates from the firm.
Indeed over 50 percent of those employed by the firm at age 50 leave
before 60 and 90 percent before age 65. The jumps in departure rates
at specific ages coincide precisely with the discontinuities and kink
points in the worker compensation profiles that result from the pension
plan provisions together with wage earnings profiles and Social Security
accrual.
A great deal of effort has been devoted to estimating the effect of
Social Security provisions on labor force participation. In particular,
Hausman and Wise (1985), Burtless (1986), and Hurd and Boskin (1984)
have attempted to estimate the effect on labor force participation of
the increases in Social Security benefits during the early 1970s. It would
appear from the results here that the effects of these across-the-board
increases in Social Security benefits are likely to be small relative to
the effects of the private pension provisions. For example, it seems
clear that shifting the age of early retirement from 55 to 60 would have
a very dramatic effect on departure rates. Leaving the early retirement
age at 55 but eliminating negative pension and Social Security accruals
thereafter would apparently also have a substantial effect on retirement
rates. Precise estimates of the effects of such changes will be made in
future work.
Notes
1. See Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987).
2. The decline in this firm at age 65 is likely to be mild compared to that in
many other firms in which the fall in pension accrual at age 65 is much greater
than it is here. See Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987).
3. For more algebraic detail on the calculation of pension wealth, see Kotli-
koff and Wise (1985).
4. Managerial compensation is primarily in the form of salary, whereas the
compensation of salespeople is in the form of commissions to a large extent.
They may be more like self-employed or piece-rate workers. In particular, their
earnings may be determined to a large extent by the number of hours that they330 Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise
choose to work. This may also affect the relationship between compensation
and retirement. Firm officials inform us, however, that most salespeople work
only for the firm. To the extent that the number of hours that they work do
not decline substantially with the wage, these graphs may reflect age-productivity
profiles.
5. There should be no presumption that men and women classified by us as
office workers are performing the same jobs. The classification does not assure
that.
6. Simulated actual future earnings could be obtained by taking a random
drawn,, from the estimate distribution of t\, N(O,&fy, for each future year and
using Eit — e<
x''
+a' e^n. If Eit were used in equation (4) instead of In Eit, there
is no need to use the nonlinearity correction.
7. This comparison may not be precise because the special incentive, were
it to be prolonged, would alter the retirement rates prior to each of the ages
considered in 1982.
References
Burtless, Gary. 1986. Social Security, unanticipated benefit increases, and the
timing of retirement. Review of Economic Studies 53 (October):781-805.
Hausman, Jerry, and David Wise. 1985. Social Security, health status, and
retirement. In Pensions, labor, and individual choice, ed. D. Wise. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Hurd, Michael, and Michael Boskin. 1984. The effect of Social Security on
retirement in the early 1970s. Quarterly Journal of Economics (Novem-
ber) :767-90.
Kotlikoff, Laurence, and David Wise. 1985. Labor compensation and the struc-
ture of private pension plans: Evidence for contractual versus spot labor
markets. In Pensions, labor, and individual choice, ed. D. Wise. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
1987. The incentive effects of private pension plans. In Issues in pension
economics, ed. Z. Bodie, J. Shoven, and D. Wise. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Comment Ariel Pakes
Larry and David have demonstrated, I think convincingly, that pension
plan provisions can influence retirement behavior. Indeed, the empirical
results in this paper make it clear that, at least in the firm studied here,
retirement is responsive to jumps in pension accruals, and that the
extent of the response depends positively on the magnitude of the jump.
On the other hand, it is not clear whether they (or anybody else) can
Ariel Pakes is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.331 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
do as convincing a job on the second stage of the analysis, that is on
obtaining interpretable estimates of the response coefficients of inter-
est. To obtain such estimates will require a more detailed model. Since
I have little to add to their descriptive work, I shall focus my comments
on the modeling problems that are likely to arise in obtaining these
estimates (even though many of these problems were noted in the
presentation).
Models for stopping full-time employment, like all stopping models,
should work off the differences between the perceived distributions of
the stream of benefits from full-time employment and the benefits from
the relevant alternatives. As other papers in this conference have il-
lustrated, the relevant alternatives include both partial retirement and
full-time leisure. There is, however, no information in this data on
whether an individual who left full-time employment did so for partial
retirement or for full-time leisure. Further, there is very little infor-
mation available on individual characteristics. It would, therefore, be
difficult to build a model which would allow us to determine the mo-
tivation for, and the benefits from, partial retirement from data and
estimated parameters. Models which do not allow for partial retirement
estimate the impact of pensions (and for that matter of Social Security)
on retirement by comparing the benefits from full-time leisure to the
benefits from full-time work. If partial retirement is an effective alter-
native, then the income differences the model attributes to "retiring"
will be overstated, and responses to monetary incentives (such as to
changes in pension accruals) will be inconsistently estimated. More-
over, when we consider the impact of pension schemes on labor force
participation rates, the problems generated by this inconsistency will
be compounded by the fact that many of the people we are counting
as retired will in fact be employed—albeit only part of the time.
The age-earnings profiles estimated in this paper illustrate the con-
founding effects of retirement behavior on the interpretation of the
parameters of interest. A stopping model of retirement behavior would
predict that the people who are working at later ages are those whose
returns from work (wages) are abnormally high (for those ages), while
those who retire should have low returns. In the years where there is
a lot of retirement we ought to find that this selection process increases
the average wage of those continuing to work—even though every
individual's wage profile may well be declining. Figure 10.1 illustrates
this point. At age 55 there is a jump in pension accruals and a conse-
quent sharp increase in the hazard for retiring. At age 62 there is a fall
in pension accruals and a consequent prior increase in the retirement
hazard. At both these ages Larry and David estimate an increase in
the earnings-age profile. These increases may have little to do with the
earnings-age profile of any individual in the sample. It is just that the
retirees should be precisely those individuals whose earnings are low332 Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise
and falling. If we were to estimate an age-earnings profile in conjunction
with a stopping model of retirement behavior, the model itself would
account for the selection induced by the endogenous retirement deci-
sion, and we might well find a falling profile. Clearly, without such a
model we should be very careful how we interpret the profile's esti-
mated parameters.
A comment on the process assumed to generate earnings is also in
order. The assumption made here is that the unobservable, or distur-
bance, component of (log) earnings consists of a time-invariant
individual-specific "random" effect, \xu plus an independent and iden-
tically distributed, 77,,. Though this process has been used frequently
in the past, I think it is inappropriate in the current context. It states
that the unobservable component of earnings at age 60 has the same
correlation with the unobserved component of earnings at age 59 as it
does with the unobserved component of earnings at any other age (say
30). Though this may well be a good approximation for labor force
participants in the prime of their working life, it is unlikely to be ad-
equate in later ages when health and family status considerations are
likely to play a dominant role in determining the value of these unob-
served determinants of retirement behavior.
Use of the random-effect model will also create econometric prob-
lems. If rRi is the random retirement time of individual /, and P{TRJ = t}
designates the probability that TRJ = t, then whatever model is even-
tually used will have an equation of the form:
P{T*J = /} = f(Eit, Eit+T, . . . , PW,,, PWft+1, . . . ; /3),
where Eit is earnings in year t,Eit+T signifies parameters of the distri-
bution of earnings in year t + T given the information of year t, PW
denotes pension wealth, and p is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
A crucial parameter of Eit+T will be /x,. However, (JL, will only be con-
sistently estimated as the number of observed time-periods per indi-
vidual grows large (the usual asymptotics for panel data problems is
in dimension N, the number of individuals). In short panels, ^ will be
estimated with error. This creates an errors in variables problem. More-
over, since P{TRJ = i] is a probability statement,^-) must be nonlinear,
so the error must be inside a nonlinear function. To consistently esti-
mate the parameters of a nonlinear errors in variables problem we need
to know the entire distribution of the error and then integrate out with
respect to it. Though this may be feasible, it seems unduly difficult,
especially when the specification causing the problem is so much in
doubt. The authors may well be better off making a more conventional
Markov assumption on the disturbance in log-earnings.
One final suggestion. The authors correctly stress that there is a great
deal of variation in the provisions of pension plans. One question that333 Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
arises and that these data seem, therefore, particularly well suited to
analyze is: What forces underlie the structure of the pension plan?
Indeed, when we do finally obtain adequate estimates of the effect of
pension provisions on retirement and then experiment with the effects
of alternative pension schemes, we will also want to ask ourselves what
effects will changes in the pension scheme have on alternative aspects
of individual behavior. The other aspects of behavior that pensions
have marked effects on are likely to be precisely the same aspects that
generated the shape of the current pension provisions.